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FIJI
The dominating feature of I988 for Fiji
was its attempt to come to terms with
the consequences of the preceding
year's two military coups. While many
claimed the country had now changed
irrevocably through the installation of
de facto military rule, the Rabuka-
dominated order, with Ratu Sir Penaia
Ganilau as President and Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara continuing as Prime
Minister in an interim government,
accorded urgency to persuading pub-
lics at home and abroad that Fiji was
returning to normal. For the Austra-
lian, New Zealand, United States, Brit-
ish, and neighboring South Pacific gov-
ernments, there was a predisposition to
take the regime at its word about its
intentions. For the Mara government,
the major objectives on the road to
acceptability included acquisition of
legitimacy via constitutional change,
economic recovery through incentives
and enlistment of foreign interests,
and, not least, keeping a firm local lid
on a potentially volatile mix of social,
political, and ethnic conflict.
The proposed constitutional refor-
mulation, in particular intentions .
about parliamentary representation,
saw details drip fed through a series of
far from consistent statements.
Through a major address to the nation
in March, Ratu Sir Kamisese said that
it was the intention of his interim
administration to "hold free and open
elections once a broadly acceptable
constitution was completed." Never-
theless this would "have to ensure the
full protection of the fundamental
interests and concerns of the indige-
nous Fijian people, but at the same
time accommodate on a fair and equi-
table basis the position of other com-
munities" (PIM, May 1988 , 37).
Yet in July, when details for such a
single chamber parliament comprising
71 seats were announced; such princi-
ples of equity were hardly in evidence.
Indians would elect 22 representatives
from a communal roll; Fijians would
have 28 representatives although, inter-
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estingly, these individuals would be
elected indirectly through the existing
provincial council structure. As well as
being a denial of basic suffrage for
future Fijian electors, this measure was
obviously designed to empower local
chiefs. Other races, so-called general
voters, would elect 8 representatives,
while Rotumans would have I. Of the
12 remaining seats, all would be filled
by appointment: 8 by the president, 4
by the prime minister (both posts
reserved for Fijians), with 1 seat among
these being permanently reserved for
the current commander of the coun-
try's security forces.
As outlined, the proposal was a bla-
tant gerrymander that favored the
dominating eastern chiefly establish-
ment. By abolishing the former system
of national election, where almost half
of the candidates elected to the lower
house of parliament were elected by
"cross-voting" of electors of all races,
the plan stymied any chance of a party
winning a majority of seats by multira-
cial appeals. And for bodies such as the
increasingly fragmented Taukei move-
ment and Fijian Nationalist Party,
which had previously campaigned with
vigor against aspects of chiefly rule at
election time, that opportunity was
now curtailed.
Aware of these disquiets, and mind-
ful that public discussion had been
driven underground, the regime went
through the motions of consultation by
establishing a Constitution Inquiry and
Advisory Committee headed by Colo-
nel P. Manueli, a Rotuman and former
commander of the Royal Fiji Military
Force. While Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau
called on the public to cooperate with
this body, he acknowledged that
soundings about constitutional accept-
ability had to realize there must be a
just and honest appreciation of the spe-
cial position of the indigenous Fijian
community. While Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara expressed hope that free and
open elections under the proposed plan
would be possible before the end of
1989, Rabuka himself was far less
forthcoming. For Dr Timoci Bavadra,
ousted as prime minister by the May
1987 coup, the plan was undemocratic,
discriminatory, and unacceptable.
Questions as to whether Rabuka
was sincere about any effective return
to the civil rule of law were sharpened
by his June promulgation of sweeping
security provisions by decree. This pro-
vided for immediate arrest, detention,
and search without warrant-measures
that were employed arbitrarily to
silence and intimidate academics, law-
yers, unionists, journalists, and dis-
senters. Leading public figures
accorded such treatment included Fiji
Times editor Vijendra Kumar, foreign
minister in the ousted Bavadra govern-
ment, Krishna Datt, and the unionist
Mahendra Chaudhry. These sweeps
were especially intense at mid-year fol-
lowing the discovery by Sydney cus-
toms authorities of an arms cache pre-
sumed destined for Lautoka, and the
subsequent arrest by British police of
an Indo-Fijian, M. R. Kahan, charged
with implication in planning this ship-
ment.
Civil rights abuses by the regime
were criticized by Amnesty Interna-
tional and the Indian government,
while Australia indicated that any fur-
ther increase of aid to Fiji would
remain conditional on progress toward
a return to constitutional rule and
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relaxation of the June security decree.
Under these conditions, it was not sur-
prising that of the 3200 people who left
Fiji on a permanent basis during the
first seven months of 1988, 86 percent
were of Indian origin.
To combat sluggish economic per-
formance, where inflation rose to II
percent and where unemployment was
at an official rate of 10 percent, the
regime was active in attempting to
attract foreign investment. This
included plans for a tax-free zone per-
mitting foreign enterprises with heavy
export orientation generous long-term
concessions, the establishment of for-
eign textile concerns using cheap local
labor, and the sale of tourist and hotel
assets to holdings such as the Japan-
based Electrical Industrial Enterprises.
Because of retrenchment and a
decline in imports, two devaluations of
the Fiji dollar in 1987, and reasonably
buoyant world sugar prices, the coun-
try's foreign exchange holdings
remained healthy at over F$200 million
for most of 1988. Otherwise stringent
regulations regarding Sabbath observ-
ance were relaxed to permit cane har-
vesting. For the longer term, and in
respect of operations such as the tourist
industry, the economic future of Fiji
was seen as depending critically on
whether continuing political uncer-
tainty could be resolved and confidence
restored.
Throughout Fiji during the year,
social conditions on a daily basis
remained outwardly calm, though such
placidity was deceptive. Relations
between the two major communities
remained sullen and distant. While Dr
Bavadra attempted to rebuild support
for his Labour Party along multiracial
lines in west Viti Levu, his September
claims that the power of prayer had
facilitated an accommodation with a
faction of the Taukei movement
headed by the extremist Ratu Meli
Vesikula received a mixed response
among Indian leaders.
Although the University of the
South Pacific maintained a full pro-
gram throughout the year, Pacific
Islands leaders conferring at their
regular Forum meeting in September
(where Fiji was kept off the formal
agenda), expressed private concern at
the university's longer term prospects.
Within a climate of growing conserva-
tism and fear of debate or criticism,
such concern seemed justifiable.
Finally, the year for Fiji was perhaps
most fittingly epitomized by Rabuka's
decision, on the eve of the republic's
first anniversary, to promote himself
forthwith to the rank of major general.
RODERIC ALLEY
NEW CALEDONIA
A dramatic shift in the political situa-
tion of New Caledonia occurred during
1988 with the change of government in
France from the conservative President
Chirac to the second socialist presi-
dency of Frans;ois Mitterrand. Solidly
conservative policies were in place in
the territory following the September
1987 referendum, in which almost all
of the 59 percent of the population that
voted favored New Caledonia remain-
ing part of France. Despite the strong
opposition of the major Melanesian
political coalition, the Front de Libera-
tion Nationale Kanake et Socialiste
(FLNKS), the minister for overseas
departments and territories, Bernard
POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA
Pons, had then introduced a new stat-
ute for New Caledonia. This promised
to disadvantage the Kanaks, who had
already lost much ground under the
conservative regime, by considerably
reducing the significance of the
regional councils established under the
previous socialist government, by with-
drawing power from the territorial
congress, by removing the distinct civil
status of Melanesians in the territory,
and by radically transforming Melane-
sian land rights.
Land issues resurfaced in February
1988, with a violent dispute over the
location of a new hospital in the east
coast town of Poindimie triggering the
mobilization of opposition to the Pons
statute (IE, March 1988, 20). FLNKS
leaders vowed to boycott the upcoming
regional elections and strongly
opposed the scheduling of the national
presidential elections on the same day,
which they saw as a French govern-
ment attempt to weaken the impact of
the boycott. On 22 April, two days
before the elections, a commando
group of Kanaks made a dawn raid on
the gendarmerie at Fayaoue on Ouvea
Island, killing four gendarmes and tak-
ing twenty-seven hostages. Some were
released a few days later but others,
along with police and officials who
arrived subsequently, were held in a
coral cave in the north of the island.
Further violent incidents followed as
the "muscular mobilization" sought by
FLNKS leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou took
different forms in different parts of the
territory. The two rounds of the presi-
dential elections went ahead, and
Chirac, trailing Mitterrand in the first
round, launched a military raid against
the Kanak militants on the eve of the
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second round. The remaining twenty-
three hostages were rescued in the raid,
but nineteen Kanak militants, includ-
ing their leader, Alphonse Dianou,
were killed. Kanak anger and resent-
ment increased as evidence accumulat-
ed to suggest that some militants had
been killed after their capture (PIM,
June 1988, 8; PR, 28 April 1988, I).
The reelection of Mitterrand and
the installation of Michel Rocard as
prime minister brought an end to hard-
line confrontationist policies in New
Caledonia, although tensions there
remained high. The process of estab-
lishing dialogue with both pro- and
anti-independence supporters began in
May when Rocard sent a six-man mis-
sion to the territory. All but the
extreme right-wing parties, the Front
National (FN) and the Front Caledo-
nien (FC), met with the mission (IB,
June 1988, 6). Rocard achieved further
diplomatic success in June when FLNKS
leader Tjibaou, and Jacques Lafleur,
leader of the loyalist Rassemblement
Pour la Caledonie dans la Republique
(RPCR), who had not met officially
since 1983, both participated in talks in
Paris. A provisional accord was signed
and discussed extensively by the major
factions in New Caledonia (PIM, Aug
1988,18; IE, Aug 1988, 9; PR, 7 July
1988, I). Delegations from FLNKS and
RPCR flew to Paris for a second meeting
in mid-August. With only minor
amendments to the original proposal,
the Matignon Accord was signed by
representatives of both parties on 20
August 1988 (PIM, Oct 1988, 12; Con-
nell 1988; Fraser 1988).
The Matignon Accord introduced a
one-year period of direct rule from
Paris, exercised through a new resident
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high commissioner, that commenced
on 14 July 1988. In an effort to put
some political power back into Kanak
hands, the territory was again divided
into regions, two of which (the north
and the Loyalty Islands) the FLNKS will
control after the elections scheduled for
mid-1989. The RPCR will dominate the
third, the politically and economically
important southern region, which
includes the Noumea urban area, the
Thio nickel-mining complex, and Yate
hydroelectric dam, and the Isle of
Pines tourist center. The reaction to
this part of the proposal was cautious,
with concern expressed, especially by
Kanaks, that this new regional
arrangement will lead eventually to
partition. The accord also included
provisions designed to redress existing
economic imbalances, with three-quar-
ters of new government investment
destined to go directly to the two rural
regions, and to specified development
projects in the north of the main island.
Also proposed were various training
programs for Melanesians, the most
significant of which would increase
their representation in the higher eche-
lons of the public service. These pro-
posals were generally welcomed,
although there were Kanaks who saw
them as part of a move to increase the
number of Melanesians willing to sup-
port the continuation of the French
presence.
The Matignon Accord provides for
a new referendum on independence to
be held in 1998. By denying migrants
arriving during the next decade a vote
in the referendum, the accord effec-
tively freezes the 1988 composition of
the electorate. Nevertheless, there
seems little prospect of a majority vote
for independence even then, not least
because approximately 20 percent of
Melanesians consistently vote in favor
of continued ties with France. Concern
was expressed within the FLNKS that
independence was effectively being
postponed for a minimum of ten years.
One of the parties in the FLNKS coali-
tion, Front Uni de Liberation Kanake
(FULK), eventually split ranks over the
issue to oppose the accord. Despite
opposition from this group as well as
from the right-wing FC and FN parties,
who are opposed to any notion of inde-
pendence, the accord was eventually
signed by the major political groupings
and endorsed by 80 percent of voters in
a national referendum conducted on
6 November (PR, 9 Nov 1988, I).
However, the referendum results
raised some questions about the plan's
long-term prospects. Only 37 percent
of French voters participated in the ref-
erendum, somewhat less than the 40
percent turnout that Prime Minister
Rocard had argued would give it valid-
ity. In New Caledonia, the turnout was
better (63 % ) and the yes vote lower
(57%) than for the nation as a whole.
Most of the no votes were cast in the
European-dominated electorates in the
south and west of the Grande Terre,
while in the largely Kanak areas the yes
vote averaged around 80 percent. The
campaign by Yann Celene Uregei and
his colleagues in FULK to persuade
Kanaks to oppose the accord did not
inflict much damage on FLNKS solidar-
ity. But the RPCR campaign for a yes
vote did receive a setback as significant
numbers of its traditional supporters
followed the lead of the FC and FN and
other small parties and voted no.
Whatever the longer-term prospects,
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the acceptance of the Matignon Accord
ushered in a period of political stability
in a territory still numb from the vio-
lence in Ouvea.
The signing of the accord also
brought a degree of relief in the Pacific
region and beyond as this trouble spot
appeared to be more firmly directed
toward peaceful political evolution.
The South Pacific Forum expressed its
approval in September, relations be-
tween France and Australia improved,
and the United Nations Decolonization
Committee responded sympathetically
to the new French initiative. Even
Vanuatu, France's most persistent
regional critic, expressed support.
What this means, of course, is that the
FLNKS is likely to receive less external
support in the future as it continues to
work for independence.
The economy was also boosted by
the signing of the Matignon Accord.
Indeed, 1988 was one of the best years
for the economy this decade, with high
nickel prices prompting talk of a new
nickel boom. The prospects of in-
creased foreign investment were good,
not least in the tourist industry, which
received more attention from Japanese
tourists and investors, raising the pos-
sibility that a resort complex will even-
tually be developed at Tiare. However,
economic growth remained concen-
trated around Noumea. Even with the
Matignon Accord, it will be extremely
difficult to change the regional struc-
ture of development.
Independence for New Caledonia
appears as unlikely now as in the past.
The increased subsidies provided under
the terms of the accord will make it dif-
ficult for the FLNKS to revitalize the
agricultural sector and sustain visions
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of an independent and socialist Kana-
kyo Furthermore, there is little evidence
that France is now willing to abandon
this distant relic of empire. Rocard has
stressed that his ultimate aim is to
ensure that New Caledonia remains
part of France, a solution that is anath-
ema to the FLNKS. The change in gov-
ernment in Paris, despite all the drama
and acclaim, has effectively produced
only subtle, if elegant, change. Never-
theless, the achievement of even a frag-
ile peace represents a major success




The opening of the vote of no-confi-
dence season six months after a prime
minister assumes office usually marks
the beginning of a difficult period in
Papua New Guinea politics. This was
certainly the case in 1988 when the
expiration of Prime Minister Paias
Wingti's constitutional grace period
precipitated a frenzy of political activ-
ity that culminated in his ouster in July.
Things calmed down considerably in
the second half of the year as Wingti's
replacement, Rabbie Namaliu, a forty-
one-year-old Tolai from East New Brit-
ain, settled into the difficult business of
keeping a coalition government togeth-
er. These events raised more starkly
than before questions about the stabil-
ity of the system of parliamentary
democracy established in Papua New
Guinea at independence in 1975.
Prime Minister Wingti entered 1988
with coalition management problems
that centered on former defense com-
mander Ted Diro and his supporters in
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the Papua-based People's Action Party,
the second largest of the five coalition
partners. Diro's aspirations to be dep-
uty prime minister had been put on
hold after the 1987 elections, pending
the outcome of an official inquiry into
the forest industry-including allega-
tions of his gross financial misconduct
when he was minister for forests in the
first Wingti government. Pressure to
restore Diro to cabinet rank increased
in late January 1988 after the District
Court acquitted him of five perjury
charges arising from his testimony
before the commission, and some Port
Moresby rascal gangs tried to force the
issue with threats of violence (TPNG,
28 Jan-3 Feb 1988, I; 18-24 Feb 1988,
7). However, the court's decision,
upheld by the Supreme Court in early
August, was a technical one based on
the surprising absence of a perjury
clause in the Commission of Inquiry
Act, and by no means cleared Diro's
name. The allegation that Diro had
received a 1987 election campaign con-
tribution of US$139,000 from the then
head of the Indonesian security forces,
General Murdani, was confirmed by
Wingti after meeting with Murdani in
Indonesia in January 1988 (TPNG, 28
Jan-3 Feb 1988, 2).
It was clear early in 1988 that the
crucial Papuan bloc in the government
was split between support for Diro and
loyalty to the prime minister. But
Wingti employed some innovative tac-
tics in his fight to survive the vote of
no-confidence expected in April. Early
in March, with no more government
ministries available to attract or retain
supporters, he unveiled plans to put
backbench MPS in charge of twenty-
seven statutory bodies (TPNG, 10-16
March 1988, 3). In April, some two
million kina were diverted from the
Civic Action Programme to supple-
ment existing "slush funds" available to
individual MPS for use in their constitu-
encies (TPNG, 14-20 April 1988 , 3).
Then on II April, less than three hours
into its first 1988 session, and after the
motion of no-confidence had been
introduced, Parliament was abruptly
adjourned by the government. On the
same day Wingti reluctantly appointed
Diro to the cabinet as part of a last-
ditch attempt to retain the support of
the People's Action Party and save his
crumbling government (PR, 14 April
1988, I).
Opposition cries of foul play were
silenced by the announcement on 20
April of a Grand Coalition of National
Stability, based on Wingti's People's
Democratic Movement and opposition
leader Michael Somare's Pangu Patio
The move was initiated by Wingti in an
apparent bid to rid himself of Diro and
the People's Action Party, but immedi-
ately fell into disarray as both sides
scrambled for ministries and attempted
to include their allies in the deal (PR,
28 April 1988, 4). The crisis deepened
in late May when another attempt at a
grand coalition of the two parties
failed. This time Rabbie Namaliu, who
had replaced Somare as Pangu leader
the previous week, signed the memo-
randum of understanding on behalf of
the opposition on 26 May (PR, 26 May
1988,3). The "irrevocable commit-
ment" to stay together until the 1992
elections lasted less than a week.
Declaring the agreement void, ostensi-
bly because Somare had turned down
the foreign affairs portfolio, Wingti
announced a "revitalized" coalition
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government that excluded both Pangu
and Ted Diro. This was made possible
by bringing Michael Mel and his
Highlands-based National Party into
the government, while retaining the
support of most of Diro's colleagues in
the People's Action Party (PR, 9 June
1988,1).
Wingti's claimed support of more
than seventy MPS was eroding quickly
as Parliament reconvened on 27 June.
At first, the unrest was most apparent
among Papuan ministers such as Allan
Ebu, Galeva Kwarara, and Akoka Doi,
who had been pushed aside to accom-
modate the Highlands members of the
new coalition. But the defection of Paul
Pora and four of his fellow Highland-
ers in the newly recruited National
Party proved to be the crucial factor in
Wingti's defeat. On 4 July the eleventh
vote of no-confidence since 1978 was
carried in Parliament 58 to 50, and
Papua New Guinea's fourth prime min-
ister, Rabbie Namaliu, set about form-
ing a government of "reconciliation,
reconstruction and unity" (PIM, Aug
1988,10).
Namaliu, who holds a master's
degree from a Canadian university,
was first elected to Parliament in 1982,
and served as foreign minister in the
1982-1985 Somare government. In July
1988 he announced a six-party coali-
tion government consisting of Pangu
(13 ministries), People's Action Party
(4 ministries), Papua Party (1 ministry),
Melanesian Alliance (4 ministries),
National Party (3 ministries), and
League for National Advancement
(1 ministry). Two independents also
received cabinet positions, making a
total of 28, the maximum allowed
under the constitution (PR, 21 July
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1988, 3-4). The distribution of portfo-
lios reflected Namaliu's attempt to bal-
ance regional interests, with each of the
nineteen provinces getting a ministry,
while simultaneously rewarding those
who had defected from Wingti's coali-
tion. Wingti's foreign minister, Akoka
Doi, became deputy prime minister,
while Paul Pora was rewarded with the
key finance and planning ministry.
Michael Somare reversed his grand
coalition decision of late June and
accepted the position of minister for
foreign affairs.
The prime minister's statement of
early August indicated some new
emphases in government policy, but
foreshadowed no radical change of
direction for Papua New Guinea. Some
of the new priorities were reflected in
the November budget, with more
resources allocated for education and
to combat the serious "law and order"
problem. However, Namaliu had
inherited his own law and order prob-
lem in the form of an unrepentant Ted
Diro, who expects to become deputy
prime minister if and when he is
cleared of the criminal charges pending
against him. The stabbing attack by
Port Moresby rascals on Judge Tos
Barnett, who headed the commission
of inquiry that uncovered that evidence·
against Diro, added an ominous new
dimension to the whole affair in early
September (PIM, Oct 1988, 10).
As expected, Namaliu moved fast to
increase to thirty months the period of
immunity from no-confidence votes
afforded to incoming prime ministers.
The proposed constit~tionalamend-
ment was approved by cabinet early
in October, but had yet to begin its
lengthy journey through Parliament
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at year's end (PR, 13 Oct 1988, I).
Whether this proposal, or some varia-
tion of it, eventually achieves the neces-
sary two-thirds-majority support in
two separate sessions of Parliament
remains to be seen. Certainly it was not
in place by the time Namaliu's own six-
month honeymoon with Parliament
finished in January 1989.
The biggest loser in the mid-year
maneuvering for power was the Peo-
ple's Democratic Movement, which
suffered a further setback when its gen-
eral secretary, Gabriel Ramoi, and a
former police minister, Peter Kuman,
resigned in August to launch the Social
Democratic Party. Their central policy
plank was restrictive foreign invest-
ment policy that would allow a class of
Papua New Guinean "captains of
industry" to develop (TPNG, 4-10 Aug
1988,2). Another opposition party
launched in 1988 was the Melanesian
United Front headed by Utula Samana,
former leader of the Morobe Indepen-
dent Group and public service minister
in the Wingti government, who advo-
cated, among other things, replacing
the nineteen provincial governments
with seven states (TPNG, 14-20 July
1988, I). The long-established People's
Progress Party received a boost in July
when its founder, former Prime Minis-
ter Julius Chan, was acquitted by the
leadership tribunal of charges arising
from the Placer share issue investiga-
tion (TPNG, 7-13 July 1988, 3). How-
ever, like other members of the opposi-
tion, Chan had to decide at the end of
1988 whether he was prepared to sit
out the remaining three-and-a-half
years of his term on the opposition
benches. The alternative was to mount
a bid for government power via a vote
of no-confidence after 4 January 1989.
On the economic front, the rates of
investment and growth remained slug-
gish in all sectors except mining during
1988. Exploration for minerals reached
boom proportions with some one-hun-
dred-fifty companies spending about
150 million kina searching for gold, oil,
and gas. Development work continued
at several major gold deposits, and a
spectacular gold rush occurred on the
slopes of Mount Kare in Enga Prov-
ince, with local alluvial miners and
assorted entrepreneurs vying for quick
fortunes (IB, Oct 1988, 6).
Papua New Guinea's headlong rush
toward a mining bonanza faltered
somewhat in 1988 as domestic groups
disagreed about the appropriate distri-
bution of the benefits of mining. In late
February production ceased for several
days at the giant Ok Tedi copper and
gold mine after local people rampaged
through company housing facilities at
Tabubil, demanding the repatriation of
squatters from other provinces and
more local participation in the venture
(TPNG, 3-9 March 1988, 7). Industrial
problems, centering on union demands
for better housing facilities, sparked
more rioting and forced longer closures
in July and August (TPNG, 29 Sept-5
Oct 1988, 1,2).
The unrest at the sixteen-year-old
Bougainville copper and gold mine in
North Solomons Province was more
serious. A long-standing dispute
between the mine's multinational oper-
ator, Bougainville Copper Limited, and
local landowners was revived in March
when the Panguna Landowners Associ-
ation demanded a massive increase in
levels of compensation. In May, road-
blocks and a sit-in protest closed the
mine for six hours (TPNG, 19-25 May
1988,4). In August, and again in early
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September, the group warned that
national government responses to its
demands were unacceptable and
threatened further action against the
mine (TPNG, 4-10 Aug 1988, 5). The
threat was realized in late November
and December when buildings were
burned, personnel and equipment
stoned, and facilities bombed with
stolen explosives. Squads of police
were flown in and issued with shoot-
to-kill orders as the violence escalated
(PR, 8 Dec 1988, I). Production
resumed later in the month after the
protagonists agreed to negotiate, but a
long-term settlement was not in sight
as 1988 drew to a close.
The year was generally good for
Papua New Guinea's foreign relations.
The Matignon Accord took some of
the steam out of the New Caledonia
decolonization issue, allowing rela-
tions with France to improve. There
were indications that the Namaliu gov-
ernment would place less emphasis on
the Melanesian Spearhead grouping
than had its predecessors, and a deci-
sion was made to allow the Soviets to
open their first resident mission in the
Pacific Islands. However, relations
with Indonesia were soured by a series
of incidents on the Irian Jaya border,
including one in July when Papua New
Guinea and Indonesian soldiers
exchanged fire. Nevertheless, Foreign
Minister Somare returned from a brief
trip to Jakarta in early November
apparently reassured that good rela-
tions had been restored.
ItWas a iJatticularly busy year for .
the Defence Force, which got involved
in hostile encounters with both Indone-
sian security forces and the Papua New
Guinea government. In February, For-
eign Mininster Doi lambasted the Aus-
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tralian media for suggesting that Ted
Diro, sacked army chief Tony Huai,
and other disgruntled Papuans were
plotting a coup (TPNG, 4-10 Feb 1988,
3). Early in June there was a brief
standoff of another sort between
Wingti's ailing government and the
army, when two planeloads of armed
soldiers took over the Lae airport
ordered closed by the civil aviation
minister, Hugo Berghuser (TPNG, 9-
15 June 1988, 3). Meanwhile, the coop-
erative arrangement negotiated with
the us military in 1987 moved into
high gear in 1988. Officials and mili-
tary officers met several times during
the year to exchange information and
discuss training requirements. In
November, American army engineers
arrived to start the first of several
planned civic construction projects in
North Solomons Province (TPNG, 1-7
Dec 1988, 4). The Australians did their
part for regional security by earmark-
ing one million kina to upgrade the
naval facilities on Manus Island, sup-
plying additional patrol boats, and
agreeing to support the development of
a helicopter capability for border




The year 1988, marking the tenth anni-
versary of Solomon Islands indepen-
dence, was simultaneously exciting and
difficult. Among the events that
reflected political and social change in
the islands were the retirement of Sir
Baddeley Devesi as governor general,
and the inauguration of his successor,
Sir George Lepping. The Americans
upgraded their consulate in Honiara to
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an embassy, and several new institu-
tions, including the National Agricul-
tural Training Institute at Fote, Malai-
ta, and the Japanese-funded Malaria
Training and Research Centre in Ho-
niara, were opened in the service of
economic development. The year was
difficult largely because of concerns for
the state of the economy-especially
the growing deficit in the government's
recurrent budget-and its effects;
debates over whether the form of gov-
ernment should be changed; and
charges of corruption leveled against
the government of Ezekiel Alebua.
The weak economy and budget con-
straints have resulted in the general
deterioration of public facilities,
including schools, in recent years, a sit-
uation made more poignant by the rev-
elation in late 1987 of a major scandal
involving the misuse of millions of dol-
lars of educational development funds.
Among the top-ranking government
and business officials implicated in the
affair were former Prime Minister Sir
Peter Kenilorea (in 1988 deputy prime
minister and foreign affairs minister),
and then Minister of Education Danny
Philip (TPNG, 10-16 March 1988, 1-
2). Despite attempts by the Alebua gov-
ernment to stall the proceedings
because of their likely impact on the
national elections scheduled for late
1988, an official inquiry into the matter
headed by Michael Lodge finally got
underway in early March.
The affair centered on a 1981 low-
interest loan of A$9.8 million provided
by the World Bank to fund a five-year
project designed to dramatically
upgrade curriculum, buildings, and
equipment in primary schools. How-
ever, according to the Solomon Islands
National Teachers' Assocation (SINTA),
which insisted on the inquiry, many of
the classrooms were never built or
shoddily built; textbooks were pur-
chased overseas instead of locally;
expatriates were hired to prepare cur-
riculum materials rather than to train
local curriculum writers; school mate-
rials were purchased at several times
their normal price from Honiara Sta-
tionery Supplies through the interven-
tion of then Minister of Education
Danny Philip; and about A$3.4 million
of the funds were unaccounted for.
Large consulting fees were paid to Aus-
tralians, particularly to a Dr Rod Trey-
vaud, who has been implicated in simi-
lar scandals elsewhere. His company,
South Pacific Development Associates
(SPDA), whose directors included Sir
Peter and several other government
officials, had been awarded the con-
tract to administer the funds.
The inquiry panel eventually pro-
duced a III-page report that was pre-
sented to Cabinet in October 1988 (SN,
10 Oct 1988, I). However, this and
other alleged scandals, together with
mounting dissatisfaction over prevail-
ing economic and social conditions,
prompted charges of government inef-
fectiveness. Indeed, the Alebua govern-
ment was obliged to deal with two pro-
test demonstrations as well as a motion
of no confidence in Parliament during
1988.
On 22 March, between six hundred
and fifteen hundred people (newspaper
accounts varied) led by Alvin Wako,
member of the Honiara Town Council
for Vura Ward, marched down Men-
dana Avenue to Parliament. The group
presented a petition to Alebua that
alleged government corruption and
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secret French aid. It also criticized the
government for its financial practices
and handling of certain development
projects (SN, 25 March 1988, I). Ale-
bua denied the allegations in the gov-
ernment-owned newspaper, but not
until May (SN, 13 May 1988 , 4-5).
Two days later, another peaceful dem-
onstration by an estimated one thou-
sand Guadalcanal people and theiI
supporters was held outside the high
court building. Concerned about
recent brutal murders of Guadalcanal
people by in-migrants, the demonstra-
tors petitioned the government to repa-
triate unemployed persons from other
provinces living illegally on Guadal-
canal. They wanted all alienated lands
on Guadalcanal, including Honiara,
taken over by the Guadalcanal Provin-
cial Government, squatters removed
from traditional land, and customary
land registered to prevent individual
sale. The group also insisted that the
government abolish the present system
of provincial government in favor of a
federal system that would give each
province autonomy to run its own
affairs (SN, 31 March 1988, 3).
The government withstood several
calls for the dissolution of Parliament
during the year and survived a vote of
no confidence by one vote on 31
March. Allan Qurusu, MP for North
Choiseul and parliamentary leader of
the Solomon Ano Sasafenua party
(SAS), authored the motion, charging
corruption, lack of control over the
Public Service, investment policies
favoring foreigners, low morale among
cabinet ministers, and economic poli-
cies that hurt domestic consumers.
Had the no-confidence motion suc-
ceeded, former Prime Minister Solo-
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mon Mamaloni stood ready to form a
caretaker government (SN, 8 April
1988,1-2).
One victim of the challenge to the
government was Minister of Natural
Resources Danny Philip, who was
sacked by Alebua after he failed to
show up for the parliamentary vote
(SS, 8 April 1988, I). In his press state-
ment of 5 April, Alebua said that he
was under "considerable pressure from
his Constituency and his Party" to dis-
miss Philip, who had been implicated
in the World Bank loan scandal (SN, 15
April 1988, I).
Reviews of the Constitution and sys-
tem of government were among the
most important tasks undertaken by
the Solomons government during the
year. A variety of issues prompted
these investigations. First, there is
strong support in some areas for split-
ting up existing provinces into two or
more smaller provinces. For example,
Choiseulleaders have for some time
wished to break away from Western
Province to form their own province
(see Rilifia 1988, 9). Second, most pro-
vincialleaders favor further decentral-
ization of political power to provincial
governments, although they disagree
strongly about the appropriate distri-
bution of other government-controlled
resources. Third, traditional chiefs and
elders have periodically argued for the
"restoration and recognition of the
roles once held by traditional leaders"
(SN, 27 May 1988, 3). The difficulties
associated with this quest for recogni-
tion became apparent in August when
traditional leaders were not invited to
attend the Provincial Government
Conference (SS, 9 Sept 1988 , 3)·
At that conference the Provincial
THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989
Government Review White Paper 1988,
which had been endorsed by Parlia-
ment in April, was presented and dis-
cussed by provincial premiers and area
council presidents. This was one of
two reports recommending changes to
the structure of government that the
Solomons government had before it in
1988. The other was the three-volume,
800-page report of the Constitutional
Review Committee, led by former
Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni,
submitted to the prime minister in early
February 1988 after eleven months of
study (Solomon Islands 1988a). This
made two distinct sets of recommenda-
tions without indicating a preference
for either. Under the first plan, the
Solomons would become a "federal
republic" consisting of an unspecified
number of states of equal status, each
with considerable autonomy. Custom-
ary law and leadership would be given
prominence, and the paramountcy of
indigenous Solomon Islanders vis-a-vis
other citizens would be established. A
president would replace the queen as
head of state and would enjoy signifi-
cantly more power than the governor-
general does under the existing consti-
tution. The second plan was much less
ambitious, calling for retention of the
present unitary form of government,
but with a further decentralization of
power to the provinces. More signifi-
cant was the proposal for a bicameral
legislature, with senators appointed to
a new upper house. A president with
largely ceremonial functions would
replace the governor-general. By year's
end, no decision had been made re-
garding which, if any, of these options
would be adopted.
The Solomon Islands faces many
challenges, including a rapidly growing
population, a sluggish economy, the
lowest educational levels in the Pacific
Islands (Crocombe 1988, 12), pressure
to restructure national and local gov-
ernments, and the need for local devel-
opment. The urgency of these prob-
lems was more widely recognized in
1988 than in previous years and, more
important, the political will to do
something about them began to
emerge. This was especially evident in
the area of national human resources
planning, where activity reached a level
in 1988 that would have been unthink-
able even a few years ago. The spur
here was undoubtedly the release of the
results of the 1986 census that showed
population growing at 3.5 percent or
more annually, one of the highest such
rates in the world, and revealed that
more than fifty percent of the popula-
tion is under the age of sixteen. The sit-
uation was discussed at a high-level
seminar in Honiara in June, to which
Andrew Nori, minister of home affairs
and provincial government, delivered a
preliminary population planning policy
statement (Solomon Islands 1988b). In
July, Prime Minister Alebua dwelt on
population issues in his speech marking
the tenth anniversary celebration (SN,
8 July 1988,8-9), and in September a
second high-level workshop on popula-
tion issues and policy development was
held in Honiara to discuss a draft
national population policy (Solomon
Islands 1988c). In October, Governor-
General Sir George Lepping added his
endorsement of the need for human
resource development in a speech to
Parliament (SN, 10 Oct 1988, 4-5).
In the international arena, the Solo-
mons joined Papua New Guinea and
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Vanuatu in signing the Principles of
Cooperation that formalized their rela-
tions as members of the Melanesian
Spearhead group. Under the terms of
the document, signed in Vila on 14
March, spearhead members agreed to
conduct cultural exchanges; to pro-
mote local and regional culture; to
undertake economic and technical
cooperation; to work toward arms
control, disarmament, and the reduc-
tion of international tensions; and to
limit super power influence in the
region (SN, 18 March 1988, 1-2).
DAVID WELCHMAN GEGEO
VANUATU
What to many outsiders has been the
unpredictable course of Vanuatu poli-
tics continued on its turbulent way
through much of 1988. The year was
marked by a bitter leadership struggle
between Prime Minister Father Walter
Lini and Barak Sope, the two most
prominent individuals in the ruling
Vanua'aku Pati (vp). At year's end, Lini
was the apparent victor with Sope,
four of his supporters, and the young
republic's president all in police cus-
tody facing serious charges.
The leadership struggle began at the
end of 1987, a year of difficulties that
included a devastating hurricane,
growing external concern over Libyan
and Soviet influence, an apparent loss
of confidence in the country's financial
center, a decline in the price of copra, a
slump in tourism, and a cut in French
aid in retaliation for Vanuatu's support
for the Kanak independence struggle in
New Caledonia. Despite these prob-
lems, and the effects of a serious
stroke, Walter Lini managed to lead
the VP to a solid victory in the general
elections of November 1987, thus con-
solidating the political control he had
exercised since the country achieved
independence in 1980.
However, the VP suffered some loss
of support in the 1987 elections. Al-
though its members won 26 of the 46
seats in Parliament, the predominantly
francophone Union of Moderate Par-
ties (UMP), led by Maxime Carlot, cap-
tured 42 percent of the vote, signifi-
cantly more than the 33 percent it had
attracted in the 1979 elections. Further-
more, for the first time in three victori-
ous elections, Lini faced a challenge to
his leadership of the VP. Barak Sope,
longtime secretary-general of the party
and member of Parliament for the capi-
tal, Port Vila, was left out of the new
nine-member cabinet after an unsuc-
cessful bid to replace Lini (PIM, Jan
1988,13-15). Sope was eventually
appointed minister for transport, tour-
ism, and public works in January 1988,
but the resultant political peace proved
short-lived.
On 16 Mayan antigovernment dem-
onstration in Port Vila erupted into a
major riot that caused extensive dam-
age to city shops and resulted in the
death of one man (lB, June 1988, 13;
PR, 26 May 1988, 1,3). The protest
was a response to the abolition by the
minister for lands of the Vila Urban
Land Corporation (VULCAN), which
had managed urban land in Vila on
behalf of the government and the land-
owners since independence. The aboli-
tion was justified by the government on
grounds of cost efficiency and sus-
pected financial irregularities, but it
was widely perceived to be primarily a
political move aimed at Barak Sope, a
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VULCAN board member, who used the
corporation as a power base. Fearing
further violence that the small Vanuatu
Mobile Force would be unable to con-
trol, Father Lini sought and received
guarantees of military support from
Australia, New Zealand, and Papua
New Guinea. Barak Sope was sacked
from the cabinet, and further violence
followed, with Sope threatening to
bring down the VP government unless
there was a change in its land policy.
He argued that the appropriation of
VULCAN was "the way communist gov-
ernments work," and rebuked the Aus-
tralian government for intervening in
domestic political issues by, among
other things, flying in riot control
equipment (PIM, July 1988, 10-12).
A month later Father Lini moved to
have Sope and four other VP members
expelled from Parliament after they
had joined sixteen members of the
opposition in a no-confidence motion
against the government. In addition,
eighteen Melanesian exiles from the
Indonesian province of Irian Jaya,
including members of the Black Broth-
ers rock band, were ordered to leave
the country because of their association
with Sope. Initially Lini could not raise
a quorum to expel the rebel MPS, but
late in July some twenty-three mem-
bers, still only half of the full house,
voted to expel Sope and four of his sup-
porters. Later the same week, the
entire opposition UMP was expelled on
the grounds that its members had
refused to take their places in Parlia-
ment on three consecutive days;-These
decisions precipitated a constitutional
crisis and, in the absence of Vanuatu's
chief justice, the chief justice of the
Solomon Islands was asked to hear the
cases brought before the Supreme
Court. Justice Gordon Ward found all
the sackings to be lawful, despite the
lack of a quorum in Parliament when
the first group was expelled (PR, 4 Aug
1988,1).
Domestic discontent resurfaced in
October when the Vanuatu Appeals
Court restored Sope and his four sup-
porters to their seats in Parliament but
upheld the dismissal of the eighteen
opposition members of the UMP. In the
same month, the Vanua'aku Pati Con-
gress expelled 128 party members,
allegedly for their support of the newly
formed Melanesian Progressive Pati
(MPP) led by Barak Sope (IB, Dec 1988,
28). By-elections were held on 12 De-
cember to fill the seats formerly held by
the expelled UMP members of Parlia-
ment, but were boycotted by the UMP
and Sope's MPP, whose members had
resigned from their newly restored par-
liamentary seats early in November.
The VP won 14 of the seats, 6 unop-
posed, giving them control of 35 of the
46 seats in Parliament. The small Tan
Union party won 3, and 1 seat
remained vacant for want of candi-
dates.
A dramatic new dimension was
added to the conflict late in November
when Vanuatu's president, Ati George
Sokomanu, whose constitutional role
is largely ceremonial, warned that
Vanuatu was in danger of becoming a
one-party state and called for an early
general election. Lini angrily rejected
both suggestions, but on 16 December
Sokomanu declared Parliament dis-
solved and two days later swore in a
five-man interim government led by his
cousin, Barak Sope. The Supreme
Court quickly judged these actions ille-
POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA
gal, and proceedings to dismiss Soko-
manu from office were initiated in Par-
liament. On 20 December Sope and his
four colleagues in the abortive interim
government were formally charged
with sedition. The following day Presi-
dent Sokomanu was arrested and
charged with inciting members of the
police and mobile force to mutiny, a
charge that carries a maximum sen-
tence of life imprisonment. However,
until there is an effective opposition in
Parliament, Lini's victory must be
regarded as a hollow one.
The political disturbances of 1988
did little to help Vanuatu's ailing econ-
omy. The expected growth of the tax-
haven-based financial sector, previ-
ously the only thriving source of
income for Vanuatu, failed to material-
ize, and the country's other main
income earners, copra and tourism,
declined. The trade deficit increased,
domestic and foreign investment were
hesitant, unemployment increased,
particularly in Port Vila, and infra-
structure deteriorated, especially in the
transport sector. Although foreign aid
and European Economic Community
copra price supports helped reduce the
balance of trade problem, the general
economic decline further weakened the
position of the Vanua'aku Patio
The combination of economic and
political crisis led to a mellowing of
some of the more radical strands of
Vanuatu's foreign policy. The one-year
fishing agreement with the Soviet
Union lapsed early in 1988 and negotia-
tors failed to agree on terms for its
renewal. There was little evidence of
any dealings with Libya during the
year. Most dramatically, Barak Sope
became less critical of France following
his alliance with the UMP opposition,
and the government muted its attacks
on French policy in New Caledonia
after the Matignon Accord was signed
in August. All of Vanuatu's political
leaders expressed a desire to normalize
relations with France and to end the
animosity arising from the expulsion of
the French ambassador in October
1987 and the subsequent abrupt decline
in French aid. Vanuatu's foreign policy
thus became much more like those of
other members of the Melanesian
Spearhead group during 1988.
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